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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

STATE V. WILLIAMS: A TRAFFIC STOP WILL BE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE IF IT IS BASED ON
OBSERVATIONS OF A POLICE OFFICER THAT GIVE
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT A
TRAFFIC LAW HAS BEEN VIOLATED.
By: David Jimenez

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a traffic stop complies
with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution if the
police officer making the stop has reasonable articulable suspicion that
a traffic law has been violated. State v. Williams, 401 Md. 676, 934
A.2d 38 (2007). Specifically, the Court stated that a traffic stop based
on an officer's observation that window tint on a vehicle is in violation
of Maryland law is not constitutional if the officer cannot credibly
articulate the difference between a properly and improperly tinted
window. Id. at 692, 934 A.2d at 47-48.
On May 8, 2006, Harford County Deputy Sheriff Wood ("Deputy
Wood"), was advised that a black Mercury Grand Marquis with dark
window tint and a specific license plate number was possibly carrying
a controlled dangerous substance ("CDS"). At approximately 12:40
a.m., Deputy Wood observed the vehicle and alerted a nearby K-9 unit
before he initiated the stop. Deputy Wood had not observed the
driver, Arvel D. Williams ("Williams"), violate any traffic laws prior
to the stop. However, Deputy Wood stopped Williams because
Deputy Wood observed that the window tint on Williams' vehicle was
darker than "normal." At the time of the stop, Deputy Wood had
. neither received prior training with respect to window tinting, nor did
he possess a tint meter, which can discern whether tint exceeds the
statutory limit.
Deputy Wood previously issued approximately twelve repair orders
for tinting violations. Based on his observations, Deputy Wood chose
to issue a repair order to Williams. While preparing the repair order
and running a license and warrant check on Williams, the K-9 unit
arrived and alerted to CDS in Williams' car. After a subsequent search
of the vehicle revealed suspected cocaine and marijuana, Deputy
Wood arrested Williams. Four days after Williams' arrest, Williams
took his vehicle to the State Police Automotive Safety Division, where
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tests revealed that the windows of his vehicle satisfied the Maryland
requirement of thirty-five percent light transmittance.
Because Williams' vehicle passed the light transmittance test, the
Circuit Court for Harford County granted Williams' motion to
suppress the CDS from evidence, stating that: "[wlhen you can't find
anything else to stop the car for, [you should not] be able to stop him
because the window tinting appears to be too dark, when, in fact, it's
not too dark." The circuit court further stated that the State must
establish that the police officer was correct in his or her judgment that
a traffic violation had occurred or else lose the right to admit the
evidence discovered pursuant to the stop. The State subsequently
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, but the Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to proceedings in the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Section 22-406(i)(2)of the Transportation Article of the Maryland
Code provides that if a police officer observes a vehicle in operation
that does not allow at least thirty-five percent light transmittance
through its windows, the officer is permitted to stop the vehicle and
issue a citation and repair work order. Williams, 401 Md. at 683, 934
A.2d at 42. Deputy Wood used the pretext of such a window tint
violation to stop and search Williams' vehicle. !d. at 679, 934 A.2d at
40. This type of stop, commonly referred to as a Whren stop, occurs
when a police officer pulls over a vehicle for a specific purpose, such
as suspicion of drug possession, by using the guise of another traffic
violation committed by the driver in question. Williams, 401 Md. at
685,934 A.2d at 43-44 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996)). Whren stops are constitutional, provided that the officer has
sufficient cause to believe that a traffic violation has actually occurred.
Williams, 401 Md. at 685,934 A.2d at 44.
Not only was Deputy Wood admittedly untrained in identifying
illegal window tint, his visual observation of Williams' window only
enabled him to describe it as "[a]ppear[ing] darker than a normal
window . . . without tinting." Id. at 680, 934 A.2d at 41. Deputy
Wood elaborated on his suppression hearing testimony by further
specifying that he stopped the vehicle merely because there was tint on
the window. !d. at 681, 934 A.2d at 41. The Court, although it
affirmed the circuit court's ruling, found that a police officer need not
be correct in his or her belief that a traffic violation has occurred, but
rather the officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion that a
violation has occurred. Id. at 686, 934 A.2d at 44-45. Such a finding
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would be inconsistent with both pre-Whren and post-Whren
jurisprudence. Williams, 401 Md. at 686, 934 A.2d at 44-45.
In evaluating the Williams case, the Court looked to clarify existing
ambiguity as to what will justify a traffic stop. Id. at 687, 934 A.2d at
44. The Whren decision seemed to establish a probable cause standard
for pretextual stops, whereas the Terry v. Ohio decision only required
reasonable articulable suspicion. Williams, 401 Md. at 690, 934 A.2d
at 45-46 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); and Terry, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)). The post-Whren decision of Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998), supports the reasonable articulable suspicion standard.
Williams, 401 Md. at 689,934 A.2d at 46. Most courts have chosen to
follow that standard, finding that if an officer had reasonable
articulable suspicion that a traffic law had been violated, the stop is
valid under the Fourth Amendment. Williams, 401 Md. at 690, 934
A.2d at 46.
Further, the Court evaluated Deputy Wood's experience and
observations in determining that he did not have reasonable articulable
suspicion that the window tint violated Maryland law to justify the
traffic stop. Id. at 691, 934 A.2d at 47. The Court feared that if it
were to admit the evidence seized during Deputy Wood's stop of
Williams, Maryland law would effectively allow police officers to pull
over any vehicle with tinted windows. Id. at 692, 934 A.2d at 47.
Instead, the Court clarified that a police officer must have a
suspicion that there has been a violation of the Maryland window
tinting regulations in order to stop a vehicle for such a violation. Id. at
692, 934 A.2d at 47. In other words, if an officer chooses to stop a
vehicle for a possible window tint violation based solely on a visual
observation of the vehicle, the officer must be able to discern a
properly tinted window from a window that does not allow the
required thirty-five percent light transmittance. Id. at 692, 934 A.2d at
47. In establishing this standard, and upholding the suppression of the
CDS, the Court recognized the lack of sophistication Deputy Wood
possessed with regard to the degree of window tinting. Id. at 691, 934
A.2d at 47. To stop Williams merely because his windows were tinted
was clearly unconstitutional without a reasonable articulable suspicion
that illegal activity or a traffic violation occurred. !d. at 692, 934 A.2d
at 47.
In concurring with the overall decision, Chief Judge Bell and Judge
Greene state that they would apply an even stronger standard for
Whren stops by requiring police officers to show probable cause as the
basis of a stop. Williams, 401 Md. at 692-93, 934 A.2d at 48 (Bell,

190

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 38

c.J. and Green, J., concurring in part). The dissent felt that the traffic
stop of Williams' vehicle was supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion.ld. at 693, 934 A.2d at 48 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). Thus,
the dissent supports the overall constitutional protection that this
decision provides.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland defends the ever-shrinking
constitutional rights of citizens with this decision. By suppressing the
CDS from evidence and allowing an otherwise guilty possessor or
distributor of CDS to escape punishment, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland sends a harsh message. Police officers must realize that if
they do not comply with the constitutional rights of individuals,
potential criminals will go free. If Deputy Wood had continued tailing
Williams' vehicle until Williams actually broke a traffic law, as
opposed to attempting to create a premise for a traffic stop, the
evidence may not have been suppressed. Conversely, if the Court
would have chosen to uphold the stop and seizure as constitutional, it
would have led to a great number of random stops of law abiding
vehicles, merely because their owners have chosen to put tint on their
windows. To impose such a standard would have conflicted with a
critical aspect of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Court made the
correct decision and protected its citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures.

